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Fourth Industrial Revolution 
Fully-automated luxury communism 
A B S T R A C T   
Tremendous research, policy, and investment is directed towards a new wave of automation in 
modern societies. Most notable within discourse for the Fourth Industrial Revolution, but also in 
radical ideas for Fully Automated Luxury Communism, automation appears essential to the 
future. Advocates claim it will renew capital accumulation, boost labour productivity, and extend 
managerial control in sustainable systems of production and consumption. Noting criticism about 
future essentialism in this automation advocacy, this essay will turn to innovations in marginal 
industrious spaces within industrial societies. Here people are hacking, subverting and appro-
priating ostensibly automating technologies for purposes of creativity, collaboration, and care. 
Social capabilities in post-automation are being cultivated. Perhaps greater attention to the 
politics implied in post-automation can help open our futures to more democratic deliberation?   
1. Introduction 
Tremendous research, policy, and investment is directed currently towards a new wave of automation in modern societies. Ad-
vocates of the Fourth Industrial Revolution (4IR) argue further automation will renew capital accumulation, boost labour productivity, 
and enhance managerial control in the production of sustainable goods and services, for the benefit of consumers and society (Schwab, 
2017; Trauth-Goik, 2020). Public debate, expert analysis, and policy development urges responsible innovation in automation, and 
considers how best to adapt society to its impacts. More radically, advocacy within a Marxist framework anticipates socially revo-
lutionary possibilities in automation. An acceleration in technology is promoted in conjunction with a counter-hegemonic political 
strategy for winning state control over automation, thereby enabling a post-capitalist future of “fully-automated luxury communism” 
(FALC) (Bastani, 2019; Mason, 2015; Srnicek & Williams, 2015). 
These arguments update debates about social adaptations to automation evident in earlier waves of technological advance (Ad Hoc 
Committee, 1964; Bagrit, 1966; Bassett & Roberts, 2019; Benanav, 2020; Wajcman, 2017). The aim in this essay is different. Noting 
criticism about automation’s future essentialism, we question whether automation will be as fully in control of future events as ad-
vocates imagine. Attention is given instead to activity that subverts automation by radically repurposing the latter’s technologies. In so 
doing, capabilities are fostered which are important for more democratic deliberations about more plural and less essentialised futures 
with technology. We call these capabilities post-automation. 
Post-automation arises most prominently in an emerging industrious space, where grassroots networks subvert technologies and re- 
construct them for different purposes (Arvidsson, 2019; Smith, Fressoli, Abrol, Arond, & Ely, 2017). In place of automation’s foun-
dations in capital accumulation, managerial control, and labour productivity, post-automation commits to more plural relations rooted 
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in human creativity, conviviality, and care. Developers, activists, artists and other protagonists explore futures whose diverse horizons 
are appropriate to their situations and aspirations for sustainability. Whilst the social resources dedicated to post-automation are 
marginal compared to 4IR, the politics of the former is nevertheless deeply significant for sustainable and democratic futures. 
At least, that is the argument in this essay. Section two begins with the foundations of automation, before concurring with Kasper 
Schiølin in section three that a central difficulty with 4IR (and FALC) is its ‘future essentialism’ (Schiølin, 2019). Section four in-
troduces examples of industrious subversions of automation technology, which we conceive as post-automation in section five. Section 
six discusses the politics of post-automation and the challenges of building appropriate institutions for circulating post-automation 
more widely in society. 
2. Automation 
“[Automation] is a concept through which a machine-system is caused to operate with maximum efficiency by means of adequate mea-
surement, observation, and control of its behaviour. It involves a detailed and continuous knowledge of the functioning of the system, so that the 
best corrective actions can be applied immediately they become necessary. Automation in this true sense is brought to full fruition only through a 
thorough exploitation of its three major elements, communication, computation, and control – the three ‘C’s.” (Bagrit, 1966, p. 14) 
Automation has been a long-standing feature in modern industrial development. Propelled by competition for greater labour 
productivity, managerial control, and capital accumulation, automation is also a recurring site of social struggle (Noble, 1984). As a 
discourse, 4IR updates the foundations of automation summarised above by Leon Bagrit in his 1966 public lectures about the ‘Age of 
Automation’. Today, economic exploitation of the three ‘C’s encompasses vastly more complex systems; the kinds of feedback and 
interactions are more sophisticated; and the scope of application is more ambitious. Automation spreads beyond workplaces and 
households, into the computational control of urban systems, farming and food, health services, energy grids, policing and warfare, 
mobility and logistics, social welfare and public affairs. 
2.1. The fourth industrial revolution 
The latest wave of automation is promoted most vigorously through discourse about the Fourth Industrial Revolution (4IR) and 
policy frameworks for Industry 4.0. Automation in 4IR extrapolates advances beyond systems that are already operating globally, and 
anticipates technological breakthroughs that promise even greater control in a highly engineered future. According to leading pro-
ponent Klaus Schwab, Executive Chairman of the World Economic Forum: 
“The fourth industrial revolution creates a world in which physical and virtual systems of manufacturing globally co-operate with each other 
in a flexible way. This enables the absolute customization of products and the creation of new operating models. The fourth industrial revolution, 
however, is not only about smart and connected machines and systems. Its scope is much wider. Occurring simultaneously are waves of further 
breakthroughs in areas ranging from gene sequencing to nanotechnology, from renewables to quantum computing. It is the fusion of these 
technologies and their interaction across physical, digital and biological domains that make the fourth industrial revolution fundamentally 
different from previous revolutions.” (Schwab, 2017, pp. 7–8) 
Global business platforms will operate through advanced deployments of cloud computing, the Internet of Things, robotics, 3D 
printing, Big Data, machine learning, synthetic biology, material science, and ecologically modern technologies. It is a future promoted 
by leading businesses, management consultancies, and increasingly by national governments who orchestrate programmes of public 
and private investment in innovation partnerships (Schiølin, 2019). 4IR justifies its future as propelled inevitably by long-waves of 
techno-economic creative destruction within capitalism (Mason, 2015; Perez, 1983). Automation cannot be stopped, nor should it be. 
Rather, social adaptations have to be made in order to manage the inevitable production of winners and losers. 
“The great beneficiaries of the 4IR are the providers of intellectual or physical capital - the innovators, the investors, and the shareholders, 
which explains the rising gap in wealth between those who depend on their labour and those who own capital” (Schwab, 2017, p. 251). 
Economic studies estimate impacts on jobs and the opportunities and risks for future labour markets and incomes (Autor, 2015; 
Brynjolfsson & McAfee, 2014; Frey & Osbourne, 2015). Welfare policies explore the mitigating possibilities of basic incomes, robot 
taxes, and how best to promise future work and social benefit. Education specialists debate training the future workforce needed to 
operate the automated systems (Nedelkoska, Quintini, & Quintini, 2018). Similarly, the environmental impacts in automation will be 
managed through responsible greener technologies incentivised with market-based techniques for carbon trading, offsetting measures, 
ecosystem services, and geo-engineering. Manufactured wealth will become more sustainable through precise control of resources, 
sinks and services in more circular economies; all powered by abundant and cheaply harnessed renewable energy and nuclear power; 
and all operating efficiently through the harvesting of Big Data (Bonilla, Silva, Terra da Silva, Gonçalves, & Sacomano, 2018; de Sousa 
Jabbour, Chiappetta Jabbour, Foropon, & Godinho Filho, 2018). 
In these ways, imperatives for economic growth through automation are presented as not worsening already damaged ecological 
carrying capacities. Indeed, advances in material science, synthetic biology, and deeper engineering (and economic) enclosure of 
‘natural’ processes promise a total management of reconstituted ecologies within automated cyber-physical systems (Dauvergne, 
2020). With the future technological direction thus set, policy-makers are expected to adapt to an automated future. Curiously, those 
developing governance arrangements for adapting society to automation are expected to keep-up with policy decisions taken else-
where to promote these techno-economic advances. 
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2.2. Fully automated luxury communism 
On the political Left, some theorists anticipate socially revolutionary possibilities in automation (Bastani, 2019; Mason, 2015; 
Srnicek & Williams, 2015). Automation should be pushed “beyond the acceptable parameters of capitalist social relations” into a future 
of fully-automated luxury communism (FALC) (Srnicek & Williams, 2015, p. 254). Accelerating automation provides the technological 
means for transcending contradictions already evident in capitalism. Counter-hegemonic strategies are proposed for transforming 
social discontent into widespread public and political support for moving automation over to a post-capitalist political economy better 
equipped to manage structural underemployment and unemployment, worsening ecological degradation, diminishing costs and falling 
profitability (Mackay & Avanessian, 2014). FALC argues socialised automation will deliver an abundance of socially useful goods and 
services at diminishingly marginal cost. Automation will finally liberate people from labour and enable them to enjoy flourishing and 
meaningful lives. Abundant automated production provides the material basis for transforming ideas and expectations about work, 
income, leisure, and sustainability. Counter-hegemonic strategy needs to work the current political and economic conjuncture in ways 
that mobilises widespread social support for state-led initiatives in the socialisation of automation. 
The question becomes how to organise an equitable distribution of the products of automated abundance. Core demands in FALC 
include a generous universal basic income (UBI) oriented towards transforming social relations, drastic reductions in working time 
without reductions in pay, a cultural shift away from the centrality of work, and the provision of universal basic services. These social 
demands are supposed to induce greater automation, by making labour exploitation more costly, and thus accelerating developments 
in labour-saving technologies. As for ecological impacts, FALC shares with 4IR an ecomodernist optimism towards future technology 
fixes for the total management of sustainable production and consumption (Bastani, 2019). Under FALC, automation becomes a 
determining driver of political strategies for recuperating left-wing hope in the future, after years of defensive resistance to neolib-
eralism. And yet, like 4IR, FALC embraces automation as though it were an inevitable feature in future societies. Each situates 
automation within a different political framework, but both anticipate societies where automation itself is unquestioned. 
Not everyone is so sanguine. As with earlier waves of automation, there remain persistent anxieties about: the kinds of society 
required to make automation pervasive (Frase, 2016); the implications for citizen rights and authority (Zuboff, 2019); the uneven 
developments and deepening inequalities that might ensue (Norton, 2017); and the ecological consequences of endless productivity 
growth (Dauvergne, 2020; Hickel & Kallis, 2020). But given the powerful grip automation has across the political spectrum, what 
scope is there for hopeful futures beyond its horizon? 
3. Questioning automation’s future essentialism 
Analysing the rise of 4IR, Kasper Schiølin traces how organisations like the World Economic Forum imbue automation with “future 
essentialism”: 
“[The] discourses, narratives or visions that, through different means and practices – from historical analyses to speculative estimates to 
hard statistics and calculation – produce and promote an imaginary of a fixed and scripted, indeed inevitable, future, and that can be desirable if 
harnessed in an appropriate and timely fashion, but is likewise dangerous if humanity fails to grasp its dynamics." (Schiølin, 2019, p. 4). 
Multilateral and intergovernmental agencies, industrial associations, national governments, universities, investors, corporations, 
and so forth, all benefit by mutually reinforcing commitments to an automated future. As momentum builds, so states feel increasingly 
compelled to join the global race towards a universalized technological frontier. In so doing, attention is drawn away from alternative 
approaches to technology in society and futures are closed down. 
3.1. Present tense technologies 
In orchestrating political support and directing huge investments, 4IR perpetuates what Mike Cooley once called (in relation to 
automation in the 1980s) ‘present-tense technology’. Seemingly radical technologies are promoted in ways that project into the future 
our current economic and political structures (Cooley, 1987). Ostensibly disruptive innovations actually conserve these deeper 
structures: perpetuating the priorities of privileged interests wishing to maintain control in the future (Feenberg, 1999; Trauth-Goik, 
2020). Democratic practices suffer, “when those who imagine the future and decide upon its values are the same as those who own and 
sell the technologies that are imagined as driving it” (Schiølin, 2019, p. 18). 
FALC anticipates democracy operating through state control: “At the level of the state, there is an equally strong case to be made for 
democratic control over technology development, given that most significant innovations come from public-sector financing rather 
than the private sector” (Srnicek & Williams, 2015, p. 342). The democratic details are scarce. Many states actually promote auto-
mation with little regard for democratising technology. When, where and how will 4IR automation be interrupted and transcend into 
FALC automation? Benjamin Noys argues the accelerationist argument in FALC repeats a history on the left of neglecting precisely how 
technology-based instruments developed for capitalist control will transform into tools for socialist liberation (Noys, 2014). Were 
counter-hegemonic strategies to eventually (or suddenly) win state power, might the new administrators find themselves locked into 
constraining technological trajectories and infrastructures already set by 4IR (Walker, 2000)? 
Whilst FALC’s attention to future political economies and states is undoubtedly important, so too is an appreciation of the human 
cultures, creativities, and relationships that shape the details of technology politics. Who is going to redesign, innovate and maintain 
communist cyber-physical systems for production and consumption? How are (unspecified) protagonists going to equip themselves 
with the skills and resources to guide automation out of capitalism and into a socialised version? What kinds of democratic processes 
will transmit society’s aspirations and priorities into the development of its technologies? How will non-human species and our 
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common ecosystems participate in automated production systems? What capabilities, organisational models, and infrastructures will 
regulate and maintain automated systems that are ecologically and socially durable? Who will own and control specific automation 
systems? How will benefits be shared, problems negotiated and conflicts managed? 
3.2. Automation may not be so automatic 
Quite apart from practical questions, to which we return soon, automation is founded upon three assumptions that are deeply 
problematic for democratic futures. The first is automation’s presumed expansion towards full implementation. The second is auto-
mation’s premise of total control over objects drawn into its cyber-physical systems. And the third problematic assumption is that 
automation applies universally. Each assumption is questionable. 
First, analysis questions the likelihood of universal, fully-automated futures (Autor, 2015; Benanav, 2020; Thompson, 2020). Firms 
can find it easier and more profitable to deploy technologies for micro-managing workers and intensifying human tasks. Labour be-
comes controlled like robots rather than replaced by robots. Even within automated systems, their smooth operation can require 
human operatives undertaking ‘ghost work’ (usually exploitative), such as cleaning data, training algorithms, overseeing platforms, 
and tending to uncertain interfaces with society (Gray & Suri, 2019). In contrast to the workerless factory promoted by management 
consultants, automation has been accompanied historically by the emergence of new classes of human tasks, jobs and occupations 
(Freeman & Soete, 1994; Kaplinsky, 1984; Senker, 1986). That said, even the higher-skilled tasks can turn out to be alienating and 
unfulfilling for workers. So, whilst it is undeniable that livelihoods have been lost to automation and communities destroyed, the 
relations between human labour and technology are more complex than machines substituting for humans. 
FALC argues communist automation will be different (Fuchs, 2020). But even under communism the point remains: there is nothing 
automatic about automation. The practicalities of implementing automation turn upon complex dynamics in labour processes, 
business models, political economies, cultures and situations particular to places and times. Considerable capabilities will be needed, 
right down to the shopfloor, in order to navigate such complexities and shape democratically the contours and the limits of 
automation. 
Second, for all its enhanced controls and efficiencies, the environmental charge sheet against automation remains considerable. 
Most obvious is ecological damage in mining and processing the resources for building automated systems; and the destruction and 
contamination generated by the aggregate increases in global productivity that outstrips relative efficiencies in specific technologies 
(Berkhout & Hertin, 2004; Ferreboeuf, Efoui-Hess, & Kahraman, 2019; Williams, Ayres, & Heller, 2002). Escalating upgrades typical in 
digitalisation also risk drawing into faster obsolescence the materially heavy infrastructures that have been integrated into smart, 
automated systems. Creative destruction might be good for economic growth, but it has not yet decoupled productivity from ecological 
collapse (Jackson & Victor, 2019). FALC is no different to 4IR in responding to ecological concerns by doubling down on automation’s 
control strategies. Both have faith in enhanced technological controls. Environments are perceived instrumentally, as mixtures of raw 
materials, waste sinks, and eco-services appearing as objects within cyber-physical systems. Managers have synoptic control. 
Hubris in this form of total environmental management has, arguably, been one of the most profound causes underlying the 
ecological crisis. Feminist research in technology studies, for example, reminds us how automation’s objectification of natures must 
eventually confront realities in which systems are only ever partially comprehensive of the situations in which they are entangled. 
Automation is trying to objectify and articulate into its operations a plurality of sometimes troublesome and lively subjects. Multiple 
relationships between humans and non-humans spill beyond system schemas and boundaries. Values and behaviours exceed algo-
rithmic formulations (Haraway, 1991; Latimer & Gómez, 2019; Puig de la Bellacasa, 2011). With automation having less of a con-
trolling grip than imagined, so greater attention turns towards the care work required in the (overlooked or undervalued) relationships 
that systems rely upon (Arora, Van Dyck, Sharma, & Stirling, 2020). 
Third, given the complexities, universalised automation is unlikely to work. Standard models will have to give way to situationally 
sensitive starting points. Cultural considerations unsettle cyber-physical formulations. Working systems attentive to their own 
situationally-specific needs for care, repair and meaning that have to be nurtured and maintained. Universal technological templates 
are less equipped for such plurality than appropriate technologies (Bellacasa, 2017). Moving automation’s universal conceptions, and 
caring instead about plural situations, resonates with histories that call for more appropriate and convivial technologies (Illich, 1973; 
Pansera & Fressoli, 2020; Smith et al., 2017; Willoughby, 1990) – a point to which we return. 
In sum, foundational assumptions in automation are troubled by complexities and uncertainties evident in human relationships 
with technology in workplaces, in societies, and with ecologies. Notwithstanding the industrial power invested in automation’s future 
essentialism, there are grounds for questioning how fully operational and fully in control automation will be in future. Perhaps more 
essential questions relate to how to cultivate and circulate social capabilities for deliberating more democratic, plural and careful 
futures with technologies? Intriguingly, around the world different communities are already subverting piece by piece the ques-
tionable foundations of automation. Amongst other things, they do this by experimenting with alternative social arrangements for 
technologies hitherto associated with automation, whether it is sensors, data, 3D printing, design software, materials science and 
biology, digital platforms, video, logistics and decision systems, or other appropriable components. In pursuing social purposes 
different to automation, participants hack and re-signify possibilities in technologies amenable to plural futures. 
4. The industrious subversion of automation 
In a recent study, Adam Arvidsson argues a by-product of neoliberal restructuring and relocation of industrial production, including 
intensifying automation, has been the emergence of a new “industrious modernity” on the margins of capitalism. Two sources of 
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agency are building in this industrious space. Both are distinct from the industrial modernity in 4IR and FALC. 
First, there are the small and informal producer networks seeking livelihoods on the margins of industrialisation. Wherever in-
dustrial capitalism fails to absorb workers migrating to the industrial centres of the global South, or renders more precarious the 
knowledge and service workers in the global North, so Arvidsson detects a turn to “commons based petty production” amongst the 
marginalised (Arvidsson, 2020, p. 17). Thrown out and brought together by industrial forces, people collaborate in trying to forge 
livelihoods, obtain goods and services, and thereby find meaning and survival in entrepreneurial projects. Industrious networks 
become highly skilled in fashioning livelihoods from digital technologies whose antecedents developed within industrial automation. 
A ‘commons’ of skills, know-how and livelihood networks shares use of increasingly accessible and hackable technologies (Arvidsson, 
2020). 
Second, there are those employed formally in the industrial and service economy, but who find their work so unsatisfactory that 
they seek fulfilment, and sometimes work, in the industrious space. Even if not so marginalised or insecure, and benefitting from 
conventional, well-paid jobs, this group nevertheless feels alienated. They lack autonomy in their labour process, and have little say in 
the purpose to which their work is used. The industrious space offers more creative and meaningful possibilities towards fulfilment. 
Professional skills are brought into the industrious space, such as computer programming, architecture, engineering, science, and 
business. Orientations to social innovation are prevalent, helping cultivate community-skills and new methods for collaboration, 
including working with diverse and marginalised groups. Projects often aspire to more socially just and ecological patterns of pro-
duction and consumption (Seyfang & Smith, 2007; Thackara, 2015), which feeds back into the development of technologies in the 
industrious space. 
These two groups intersect. Social innovators collaborate with petty producers. Both cultivate capabilities for working collabo-
ratively and creatively, hacking and adapting technologies, and following a commons-oriented ethos that helps practices circulate 
widely. At heart, both seek dignified work with technology. The rest of this section introduces some examples. 
4.1. Commons-based peer-production 
Emblematic of the industrious space has been rapid growth globally of workshops and networks practising commons-based peer- 
production. Commons-based peer-production manifests in people openly accessing versatile digital design and fabrication technolo-
gies, and finding opportunities for skilfully appropriating these technologies for peer-production goals (O’Donovan & Smith, 2020). 
Attention tends to focus upon activities in workshops, but developments are buoyed by broader networks promoting and facilitating 
commons-based peer-production (Smith, 2017). 
Digital platforms enable the sharing of: online repositories of designs, code, instructions and advice; how-to videos; distributed 
training sessions; distanced collaboration and work organisation; design patterns and toolkits; and so forth. Online fora and campaigns 
advocate open access to tools, know-how, and transmit enthusiasm for collaborative development and mutual acknowledgement, 
usually following modular and project-based approaches. There is a recursiveness in this activity, in the sense that technologies and 
projects are themselves open to re-use, modification and further development. 
All this provides an infrastructure that radically redistributes prototyping capabilities in society and opens up technological futures 
to practical deliberation. People are able to participate in opening modern material cultures up to practical scrutiny and development. 
The political and economic contours for ‘designing globally and manufacturing locally’ are explored (Kostakis, Niaros, Dafermos, & 
Bauwens, 2015). Flexibility and adaptability in neighbourhood-centred facilities situates and grounds networked capabilities for value 
creation, thereby enabling local circular economies, community wealth building, and nurturing local creativity (Prendeville et al., 
2017; Smith & Light, 2017). Cultivated carefully, these facilities can overcome the imposition of a misplaced universalism evident in 
institutionalised technology transfer (Coban, 2018; Dias & Smith, 2018; Fox, Ulgado, & Rosner, 2015; SSL Nagbot, 2016). The fact that 
local adaptations can be instigated, and experiences shared globally, is illustrative of capabilities for more careful and equitable 
attention to different situations, different relationships, and different aspirations. 
4.2. Citizen sensing environments 
Automation perceives environments instrumentally, as raw materials, waste sinks, and eco-services for objectified control. In 
contrast, widening access to low-cost, low-power sensors, micro-controllers, platform-based data-storage, analytical visualisation, and 
wi-fi or mobile connectivity, enables more communities to sense, map and relate to a growing range of environmental phenomena. 
Citizen scientists, artists and activists are able to explore relations with environments they care about (Balestrini et al., 2017): from 
noise and pollution, through to animal species and radiation; from mapping cycle routes, to sensors for food growing; and from 
overlooked histories in places, to imaginative augmentations that envision the world from the perspective of other species. 
Participants do not simply measure these environmental phenomena, they also re-signify and reclaim them (Gabrys, 2017; Tironi & 
Sánchez Criado, 2015). Connections between local projects circulate capabilities for making sensible that which is otherwise over-
looked, invisible or under-appreciated. These capabilities can generate data and awareness of situations that official monitoring either 
ignores, fails to reach, or approaches quite differently. The creativity in this activity extends to nurturing communities that care about 
matters of concern (Puig de la Bellacasa, 2011). Indeed, the success of collaborative sensing depends upon communities mobilising 
action. Co-designing and implementing sensing activity brings people together, whether in workshops, or through events, or online 
fora linked to the data produced. Indeed, when trying to mobilise data into social change so the importance of other forms of 
knowledge beyond digitised codifications become pronounced. Anthropological and sociological knowledge about the environments 
being sensed become central for strategies of change, relationship building, and maintenance. 
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Citizen sensing thus makes use of open designs, software, hardware, and collaborative methods in ways very different to the 
proprietary enclosure and objectification of natures in automation. Sensibilities are cultivated towards a broader spectrum of human 
relationships with environments and species. More caring and less exploitative connections are made compared to the imperatives 
driving objectifications in automation (Kostakis, Roos, & Bauwens, 2016). Interest shifts, from cyber-physical systems for global 
enclosure, to convivial systems for exploring natures in common. 
4.3. Right to repair and digital durability 
Given the environmental charge sheet against digital technologies, grassroots responses to ecological challenges include practices 
of repair, care, and durability in digital technologies. Activities like repair meet-ups, how-to-guides, and videos on platforms, have 
become a mobilising component within a social movement pressing for the right to repair. Demands include businesses investing in 
design and infrastructure for repair and repair services. 
Restart Parties, for example, provide meetings and events where people can bring broken devices and learn how to fix and upgrade 
them with the help of volunteers (Lepawsky, 2020). Considerable environmental impacts are avoided. In addition, participants 
confront in a very practical way artefacts whose assembly is usually designed for linear, high-consumption economies. Disassembly 
runs against product warranty restrictions intended to discourage tinkering. Care and repair activity cultivates capabilities lacking in 
automated industrial production systems, by looking to the realities of widely distributed products needing versatile repair skills 
(Strebel, Bovet, & Sormani, 2019). 
Not only do these repair capabilities cut environmental impacts, but they also cultivate a relationship with technologies as a 
commons (Zapata Campos, Zapata, & Ordoñez, 2020). Repair is easier if designs, instructions, components, and so forth are openly 
available to people, and where design for modularity and interoperability permits adaptions, component switching, and remanu-
facture. Open guides support participants in tinkering and reshaping the technologies in adaptable ways. There is both a practical and 
ideological basis to this conception of technology as commons. Practically, because territorially rooted repairing is faced with a 
plethora of different devices to care for, and will need versatile facilities to make or access components and swap and splice devices into 
renewed, upcycled and remanufactured devices. And ideologically, because repair embodies an ethic of caring for technologies as part 
of the fabric of modern societies. 
Of course, unsustainable practices are evident in industrious spaces too. They are not a panacea (Arvidsson, 2019). Nevertheless, 
the participatory experimentation celebrated in this space builds important capabilities for deliberating material issues in very 
practical ways (Marres, 2012; Smith & Stirling, 2018). Practices from free software and open hardware - concerning modular designs, 
rights to access and modify, and responsibilities to keep modifications open – are influencing more general relations towards tech-
nologies. Bicycles, furniture, farming equipment, clothing, manufacturing technologies, and more, are being rethought in these 
commons-based terms. Capabilities for local durability, repair, and re-manufacture open up quite different futures compared to 4IR 
and FALC (Fonseca, 2015). 
4.4. Decolonising technology 
Historically, promoters of well-intentioned ‘appropriate’ technologies had to learn quickly how to enable ‘beneficiary’ commu-
nities to build their technological autonomy, such that those communities could themselves shape technologies appropriately (Smith 
et al., 2017; Willoughby, 1990). Capabilities and methods for more equitable encounters were developed (Fals-Borda, 1979). The 
advent of digital technologies has renewed this process. Indigenous populations and excluded communities are appropriating digital 
technologies using capabilities that challenge hegemonic narratives and build up their own voice (McLean, 2020). These efforts to 
decolonize technology, by challenging Western assumptions, give visibility to diverse conceptions and practices in technology (Hui, 
2016; Philip, Irani, & Dourish, 2012). 
Networks for digital fabrication in Latin America, for example, have been working to foster craft traditions and complement skills of 
indigenous communities. The incorporation of carefully appropriated digital design and fabrication tools is used to enrich traditions 
rather than to displace them (Herrera, Montezuma, & Juárez, 2018; Pascale, 2018): a tool for resistance and autonomy. Priorities can 
involve digitising and representing to new generations and diasporas the plural knowledge, language, practices, claims and rights of 
communities. Valued practices, subjectivities and culture inform future sociotechnical possibilities. Some go further, to debate how 
indigenous practices of kinship (including with non-humans) can inform developments in AI (Lewis, Arista, & Pechawis, 2018). There 
is an insistence here that diverse cosmologies shape more plural futures in technology compared to the future under modernity 
(Escobar, 2018; Hui, 2016). 
Experiments in local technological autonomy is helped by free culture activism and hacktivism projects. Stefania Milan describes 
how activists re-signify technologies and build their own digital infrastructures in order to gain autonomous spaces of communication, 
including a wide variety of media, like secure email accounts, non-profit web hosting services, but also pirate radio stations (Milan, 
2013). Grassroots groups are building wi-fi mesh networks to extend internet access into areas where there is no commercial provider. 
Projects develop online resources in local languages. Others train activists in digital self-defence against surveillance and use it to 
empower vulnerable groups to protect and claim their rights (see Fundación Karisma in Colombia, Rancho Electrónico in Mexico). 
In building capabilities for autonomy, so more diverse futures open up in comparison to the universal frontier assumed in 4IR and 
FALC. Whilst official national strategies for development seek usually to catch-up and keep up with that frontier, communities and 
activists resist, adapt, reject, and subvert technologies. 
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4.5. Platform co-operatives, data commons, and technopolitics 
Digital platforms feature prominently in automation (Srnicek, 2016). Platforms coordinate (and discipline) producers, workers and 
consumers, whilst simultaneously enabling the extraction of valuable data (Gillespie, 2010; Sadowski, 2020; Woodcock, 2020). In 
criticising platform capitalism, activism has generated considerable interest in alternatives. Platform capabilities have been adapted to 
the causes of co-operativism, for example, most notably with worker-owned and consumer co-operative platforms (Scholz, 2016). 
Capabilities are developing in commons-based approaches to data creation, use, stewardship, and circulation; as well as platform 
technologies for organising and coordinating co-operative work. Platforms are being used, for example, to help workers organise, 
gather data, lobby and bargain against exploitation in gig economy platforms. Data cooperatives initiatives are emerging in areas like 
health and urbanism. Meanwhile, technopolitical activists are developing digital platforms for direct democracy, which have found 
traction in sympathetic municipalities and organisations globally. These technopolitical platforms allow citizens to propose, debate 
and vote on policies and budget spending (Smith & Prieto Martín, 2020). As free and open infrastructures, these platforms are also 
being adopted by co-operatives in sectors like energy, mobility, and housing to enhance their internal governance capabilities. 
Typically, these alternative platform initiatives are about creating local, decentralised, and democratic tools. They are more so-
cially embedded than capitalist platforms, such as Uber, Deliveroo, and Uptasking (Graham, 2020). Platforms are built with and for 
those operating across them, with transparency, deliberation, and dignity sought in platform ownership, governance, and use. The 
value produced circulates more equitably amongst participants. As such, platform configurations are opened to the specificities of 
different places, groups, and purposes. Deliberations adapt the functions across platforms, and negotiate relationships between ac-
tivities online and offline. 
5. Post-automation 
The examples in section four are suggestive of far richer fields of practical activity. What are we to make of such heterogeneity? 
First, the subversive use of technology erodes future essentialism by demonstrating diversely adaptable social arrangements for 
technologies beyond automation. Second, these activities develop social capabilities for materially deliberating alternative futures 
beyond the horizon of automation. Third, the circulation and expansion of these capabilities can help democratise technology and open 
the politics of technology to broader social questions than efficiency, productivity, control and accumulation. 
5.1. Post-automation as capability 
Post-automation is defined as the common capabilities that enable people to subvert and appropriate technologies for more open 
futures and thereby challenge through practical demonstration automation’s future essentialism. Capabilities refers here to the skills, 
know-how, resources and infrastructures available to people to adapt technologies into developments that matter to them (O’Donovan 
& Smith, 2020; Oosterlaken, 2016). Each initiative in section four cultivates capabilities for: embedding technology systems appro-
priate to places and contexts; in which human creativity is central; based in open collaboration deliberated with others (including 
non-human species). Typically, commons-based approaches in technology and production are pursued. Ideally, all this is done in 
ecologically durable ways involving dignified work. Post-automation capabilities open up sociotechnical means towards practices of 
Fig. 1. automation and post-automation.  
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care, maintenance and wellbeing. Fig. 1 provides a schematic summary of capabilities recurring in the examples. 
In contrast, automation is propelled by relations imposed as universal and pursuant to abstract system efficiency, capital accu-
mulation, managerial control, labour productivity, material abundance, and technology acceleration. These ends are the foundations 
for automation. Faced with sustainability challenges, automation redoubles its control strategies by extending them further and deeper 
into struggling ecological and social systems. By contrast, in post-automation hierarchical control gives way to forms of digitalisation 
reconceived and reoriented instead towards more creative, collaborative and caring relationships with others in ecologies and 
societies. 
There is a risk in drawing together diverse activity within a concept like post-automation and delineating it so starkly against 
automation. Complex, dynamic and situated practices are inevitably simplified into typical features like those in Fig. 1. The intent is 
not to reduce versatile heterogeneity into a formula for post-automation. That would merely swap one essentialised future for another. 
Rather Fig. 1 illustrates capabilities that post-automation helps to redistribute in societies. 
There is a further risk, which relates to our choice to position the point of departure for post-automation in the digital technologies 
normally associated with automation. Post-automation risks being conceived as only opening up alternative digitalisations. In place of 
computation, communication and control, is emphasis in digital affordances for collaboration, conviviality and care. But for all the 
claims to flexibility and versatility, perhaps future horizons remain constrained if emphasis is limited to adapting digital technologies 
over non-digital technologies? Some durable relationships between people and their ecologies might be constrained by the parameters 
of digitalisation, for example; or some human values and creativity simply cannot be codified, represented, or mediated adequately; or 
ideas like post-growth are hard to realise through digital technologies (March, 2018)? This limitation points beyond an initial de-
parture in contesting automation, and that truly subversive activity in digital technologies will include the possibility of rejecting or 
subordinating some of them in favour of other technologies. Capabilities in Fig. 1 can certainly help to situate digital more equitably 
and openly alongside other technologies. Post-automation therefore implies that the relative standing of digital and combination with 
other technologies needs to be less hierarchical, and that the appropriateness of technologies is of more value to privileging a priori 
what appear to be the most innovative. 
5.2. Appropriate conditions for post-automation 
4IR, FALC and post-automation each approaches technology in futures in distinct ways. Table 1 summarises the orientations and 
approaches of each in terms of key protagonists, strategies, material and organisational basis, and their temporality towards the future. 
Of course, these futures are not equipoised. Political and economic power is inscribed and invested in 4IR: hence the counter- 
Table 1 
Futures under 4IR, FALC and post-automation.  
Feature Fourth Industrial Revolution Fully-Automated Luxury 
Communism 
Post-automation 
Protagonists in the 
future  
• Business leaders and industrial 
associations (e.g. WEF)  
• Multilateral agencies (e.g. OECD, 
ECLAC, EU)  
• Capital and neoliberal governments  
• Left political programmes  
• Socialist states  
• Post-work citizens liberated 
from labour  
• Industrious space  
• Social entrepreneurs and social 
movements  
• Hackers 
Strategies for the 
future  
• Future essentialism  
• Top-down disruptive innovation  
• Universalised controls  
• Capitalist growth and 
ecomodernism  
• Future essentialism  
• Top-down socialisation of 
technology  
• Universalised controls  
• Counter-hegemonic politics  
• Acceleration and ecomodernism  
• Democratization of futures  
• Open experimentation and appropriate 
prototyping  
• Convivial livelihoods situated in diverse 
ecologies 
Material basis of the 
future  
• Technology-driven  
• Cyber-physical systems  
• Markets and consumers  
• Technology-acceleration  
• Automated abundance  
• Socialised economy  
• Radically redistributed prototyping  
• Post-growth technological sufficiency  
• Capabilities for subverting and 
appropriating technologies 
Organisational basis 
of the future  
• Large firms  
• Platform capitalism  
• Consumer markets  
• Public-private partnerships  
• Limited universal basic incomes  
• Automated production centres  
• State redistribution of surplus  
• Universal basic services and 
incomes  
• Radically expanded ‘free’ time  
• Horizontal networks and redistributed 
capabilities  
• Commons-based peer-production  
• Platform cooperatives  
• Care in social and solidarity economy 
Temporality  • Already installed in dominant R&D 
agendas  
• Superficial disruptive innovation, 
with underlying social structures 
remaining the same  
• Automation develops at rate set by 
its profitability and public 
investment  
• Transcendence through 
acceleration of current trends  
• Revolution in social structures 
driven by new technological 
capabilities  
• Automation develops rapidly 
through state promotion  
• Present day subversions through social 
entrepreneurship and hacker ethic  
• Cultivating caring relations through open 
and durable technologies  
• Temporality based in expanding the 
social conditions for circulating post- 
automation capabilities  
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hegemonic strategies in FALC. Post-automation is peripheral to centres of political and economic power. It rarely features in the 
agendas and programmes of state and corporate strategies for technology development. Nevertheless, this essay argues post- 
automation merits wider social attention. The question is, what social conditions will widen and deepen attention beyond the 
industrious space? 
Such a question recalls and updates a critical issue raised for appropriate technologies half a century ago. Back then, the main thrust 
in international development emphasised modern blueprints for industrialisation. The appropriateness of this approach came under 
question and prompted arguments for alternatives (Bookchin, 1967; Cooley, 1987; Illich, 1973; Schumacher, 1973). Critics warned of 
the social and ecological consequences of industrial blueprints. There was unease over a future essentialised around large-scale, 
universalised technological advances, including automation. Alternatives emphasised locally appropriate capabilities for shaping 
and adapting technologies in more convivial and socially useful ways. Appropriate technology centres and programmes opened in both 
industrial and ‘developing’ contexts (Jequier & Blanc, 1984). Some activities became mired in debates about abstract specifications as 
to what did and did not constitute appropriate technology (Willoughby, 1990). More productive was work in developing the social 
conditions and capabilities locally conducive to cultivating capabilities in appropriate technologies in different contexts (Edquist & 
Edqvist, 1979; Smith et al., 2017). Scope for developing these social conditions deteriorated with structural adjustments in the 1990s 
and the turn to neoliberalism. The institutional landscape ceded social choices in technology to market-based investment decision 
(Kaplinsky, 2011). One unintended by-product of those structural changes has been the industrious space. Compared to appropriate 
technology centres, however, the industrious space today connects practitioners and communities across networks in ways unheard of 
in the earlier programmes. Capabilities circulate in ways unavailable to earlier generations. Post-automation nevertheless faces a 
similar political challenge in terms of influencing social conditions beyond its originating space, and thereby expanding the circulation 
of capabilities in ways that are more influential for societal futures. 
6. The politics of post-automation 
Given post-automation develops through heterogeneous cultural and economic activities, so its protagonists will have different 
ideas about what they are doing and what it means. Critics can reasonably argue that it isn’t clear what a focused programme for post- 
automation looks like. Industrious ambitions appear limited to pursuing meaningful activity in specific projects that are either 
personally fulfilling, contribute to livelihoods, or provide specific community benefits. Coordinated developments exist in some areas, 
such as for data commons and platform cooperatives, or commons-based peer-production and citizen sensing. But this does not amount 
to a programme for post-automation as an alternative to 4IR or FALC. How could post-automation develop into something much more 
transformative? 
Future essentialism in 4IR and FALC leads both towards politics conceived in terms of compelling visions and programmes. In each 
case, the primary site for politics is in the articulation, consolidation, and coordination of programmes in which automation is an end 
itself. In contesting future essentialism, post-automation deliberately becomes less programmatic. Any programme, such as it is, in-
volves bringing about the social conditions for expanding capabilities beyond the industrious space (cf Coleman, 2004). The more open 
and plural futures thus enabled invite diverse visions and programmes. The politics of post-automation is based in winning societal 
support for its democratic capabilities for opening up technologies and futures. Of course, it still confronts the dominance of 4IR, and 
therein lies the political dilemma for post-automation: can open capabilities thrive without a future vision and programme? In this 
final section, we consider the political dilemma across three related sites: institutions, social movements, and political economy. 
6.1. Institutional politics 
In contributing to commons-based practices, even those industrious practitioners who are agnostic towards post-automation as a 
transformative idea nevertheless contribute to the circulation of relevant capabilities. Whilst post-automation relies upon such work, 
so others can profit from it. Business and policy entrepreneurs within market and public institutions can see opportunities in indus-
trious innovativeness for realising their own agendas. The politics of post-automation here involves struggles over autonomy and 
mutual benefits in these institutional encounters (Fressoli et al., 2014). 
Within market institutions, politics plays out in the terms negotiated with for-profit tech companies who commercialise particular 
innovations originating in post-automation. Open innovation firms already use hackathons, prizes and licencing to identify useful 
inputs for new products and services. Winning industrious innovators benefit, but the collaborative, commons-based ethos under-
pinning industrious activity tends not to. Open innovation reinvests relatively little into the wider conditions producing the creativity 
originally. In public institutions, policy entrepreneurs and governments take up issues where post-automation activity suggests 
promising policy potential. The right to repair is an example, as are turns to smart citizenship in digital urbanism. 
Post-automation protagonists have to become politically adept at working to their advantage whatever institutional openings and 
resources become available. For example, when training, entrepreneurship and innovation programmes periodically turn to concerns 
for social inclusion or responsible innovation, so some post-automation initiatives will become of interest and can attract institutional 
attention. At best, institutional invitations win temporary support for limited possibilities. They tend not to change the social con-
ditions for post-automation more generally. Institutions bend post-automation creativity towards their own agendas. Indeed, those 
agendas can include capital accumulation, labour productivity and managerial control. 
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6.2. Social movement politics 
Politics at this second site is about forging alliances with social movements whose values, demands and repertoires of activity are 
mutually supportive. Common cause is made in mobilising for social changes that are simultaneously helped by post-automation and 
supportive towards its further expansion. An example is social movements working with data cooperatives in order to produce and 
disseminate data that best represents the interests, experiences and identities of the movement on its terms, compared to distortions or 
absences in official or commercial data. Health movements, anti-racist movements, worker movements, environment movements and 
others engage increasingly in this politics of digital representation. Similarly, movements trying to decolonize their territory may use 
mapping capabilities to emphasise and defend features absent from institutional maps. Another example is neighbourhood movements 
reclaiming public spaces through the manufacture of street furniture in makerspaces. Under these conditions post-automation capa-
bilities are expanded by becoming useful additions to the repertoires of action of social movements. 
Post-automation can also become emblematic for social movements contesting injustices specific to automation. Post-automation 
provides useful infrastructure for mobilising alternatives around algorithmic justice, smart citizenship, data commons, platform 
cooperativism, or rights to repair. More broadly, in societies where state and economic power is reinforced through technology, so 
movements contesting power effectively challenge its technologies too. Pressure builds for alternative approaches in technology.1 
Mobilisations for climate, decolonization, just transitions, labour rights, postgrowth, feminism, anti-racism, LGBTQ+, rights to the 
city, and so forth can and do trouble the institutions for innovation in society by contesting the prevailing culture. Institutionalised 
assumptions, priorities, and criteria in innovation become drawn into struggles for social change. The politics of post-automation in 
institutions thereby opens to its politics in social movements. 
6.3. Political economy 
Innovation in society is understood and promoted within a growth-dependent political economy in which capital accumulation, 
labour productivity, and managerial control are paramount (Pansera & Fressoli, 2020). This political economy underpins automation. 
It is less conducive for post-automation. Building agency in technology politics at this site is challenging because struggles are filtered 
through structural relations between capital, labour and ecologies, for example, or the role of the state in society and prevailing 
ideologies. 
Practising technology as a common good, for example, is difficult when economic systems invest in technologies for exclusively 
private utility potentials and as a source of competitive advantage. Political and economic institutions that prioritise a market-based 
scaling-up of social innovations provide much more limited opportunities for creative activities whose motivating social value is rooted 
in the local scale. Developing durable, repairable and well-maintained systems is hard when political economy sees long-term care as 
an unwelcome operating cost or impediment to the profitable turnover of future novelties. Entrepreneurial states in a global race to 
catch-up with the universal techno-economic frontier are unlikely to devote serious attention to decolonizing technologies. Nor will 
ecomodernist controls over nature be so open to convivial technologies seeking relations of care in natures. 
Informal institutions conducive to post-automation already consolidate its circulation within the industrious space. Norms and 
routines for commoning, for example, are developing in areas like design, code, instruction, data, and infrastructures. The open and 
collaborative ethos in social entrepreneurship draws upon the hacker ethic, which now surpasses the social base of the latter by 
becoming much more widely practised. Alignments with social movements help circulate post-automation further. But can post- 
automation become transformational in society more generally? What might a political economy for post-automation look like? 
These questions appear reasonable but might be somewhat misconceived. They anticipate political economies rebuilt purposefully 
around post-automation. For sure, FALC anticipates a communist political economy built upon the technologically-determined forces 
of automation. But post-automation is conceived differently. It offers potentially helpful capabilities for addressing more specific 
contradictions and accompanying changes in political economy, but not necessarily driving any of those changes. 
More likely is that political pressure builds in issues where post-automation is relevant, like a future for dignified work, or post- 
growth economies, and where politicians might eventually focus their campaigns. Those calling for structural change may have lit-
tle time for the details of technology politics, or they may perceive technology as little more than a problematic ‘fix’ rather than 
understanding it as important terrain for consolidating the changes being sought. But if those struggling to transform political economy 
are to find agency in the future, then they need to counter spurious and beguiling technological determinism. Future essentialism plays 
a powerful role in modern society. Unsettling such essentialism, and loosening the reinforcing work it does for political economy, needs 
a politics of technology. Big structural issues - like dignified work, equitable prosperity, economic ownership, sustainable wellbeing, 
convivial communities, and healthy ecologies – needs a democratic politics that includes technology, rather than having the pa-
rameters for democratic politics ostensibly determined by technology. Post-automation demonstrates such political agency is possible; 
not least by releasing the powerful grip automation has upon our social imagination. Perhaps the political economic case specific to 
post-automation here is that it should become public infrastructure for democratising technology. 
1 FALC calls for alliances with social movements as part of its counter-hegemonic strategy. Automation will have to appeal to social movements, 
who must identify the realisation of their goals with such future essentialism. 
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7. Conclusions 
Future essentialism in technology politics is most pernicious when its effectively automates our futures. We need a more complex, 
diverse, and open approach to technology and its politics than that conceived in programmes for automation. This period of global 
crises should be a moment when automation’s foundations for total control, limitless productivity, and insatiable material accumu-
lation are reconsidered not redoubled. There is nothing automatic about automation. Its construction in complex societies means it is 
unlikely to be fully implemented nor fully in control. More democratic foundations for technology are required. 
The central argument in this essay has been that capabilities relevant for more democratic futures in technology are cultivated 
across the multiple sites and networks of an emerging industrious space. Capabilities that we call post-automation. Post-automation 
enables versatile approaches to embedding technology systems appropriately in places by embodying their contexts sensitively into 
technology development; in which human creativity is central and based in open collaboration with others (including non-humans); 
and where commons-based approaches towards technology permit greater ecological durability and more dignified work for people. 
Post-automation is more open to the socially complex, uncertain, and diversely situated tasks of negotiating convivial social and 
ecological relations through technologies. 
The industrious space is where post-automation finds its agency currently. The capabilities developing there are both subversive 
and constructive: they simultaneously challenge the foundations of automation and provide infrastructure for material deliberations 
about alternatives. The politics of post-automation is the struggle to expand the circulation of its capabilities beyond the industrious 
space. First, through articulations with opportunities arising in existing innovation institutions in society. Second, through alliances 
with social movements seeking mutually conducive social changes. And third, by bringing technology politics into the mass politics 
needed for structural changes in political economy. Only then can any potential in post-automation be developed in full. 
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